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WHAT IS "AN ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION"?
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE t
There is an archaic expression in the first clause of the first amendment that
makes the whole clause much less straightforward than one might wish. The
whole provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ...
One does not stumble over the first six words; it is the final four that give one a
severe pause.' Granted that Congress is to make no law at all respecting an
establishment of religion, to what does "an establishment of religion" refer?
In this brief effort to parse the critical phrase, we shall take no recourse to
the Supreme Court's famous "three prong" establishment clause test.2 However
useful the test may or may not be in tracking the modem case law, it is not
directed to the curiosity one may have in the locution of the clause as such. Nor
shall we review the nearly sixty cases decided pursuant to this clause during the
forty years since the Supreme Court's first serious address to the question, in
1947 3-much less would I impose the tedium of that review here. And neither
will we try even to sort out the principal differences within the principal lines of
passionate academic scholarship on the establishment clause, a scholarship at
once dense, formidable, and exceedingly rich.4 Rather, I mean only to parse the
four word phrase of the establishment clause itself in a willfully informal manner
t Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1955, Southern California University; LL.B.
1958, Stanford University.
1. It is unavoidable for a person from Duke, as part of a symposium at the University of North
Carolina, to note that UNC seems to have its hardest time with the final four.
2. Known in the trade as the "Lemon" test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
the rubbery three prong test is essentially as follows. To survive a litigant's challenge under the
establishment clause, a law must satisfy each of these criteria: (1) it must reflect a secular (as distinct
from a religious) purpose; (2) its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it
must not involve undue entanglements of government and religion. The test's first two parts are
taken from School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); the third part is taken from Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Sometimes, it is not followed at all, see, eg., Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983). And the Chief Justice of the United States does not subscribe to it, see, eg.,
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, "., dissenting).
3. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. The barest surface scratching turns up a number of highly impressive, mutually disagreea-
ble books within the past three years alone. The enumeration of law review symposia would be even
longer; the listing of substantial law review notes and independent articles, longer still. For those
interested even in a glance at just some of the most recent literature, see, eg., R. CORD, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); T. CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1986); L. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986); W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1985); R.
SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987); J. SWOMLEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
THE SECULAR STATE (1987); Symposium Issue, Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
833 (1986).
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I hope you may nonetheless find freshly interesting, in this bicentennial constitu-
tional year. What this brief review may lead to, if all goes well, may be an easy
three part surprise, a mnemonic device for categories of first amendment analy-
sis tied to the words of the clause. In any case, here is how it goes.
A SURPRISING FIRST POSSIBILITY: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A
SOURCE OF PROTECTION FOR STATE ESTABLISHED CHURCHES
AND STATE ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS5
As of 1787, when the Constitution was proposed, a number of states main-
tained established religions, i.e., specific churches and ministries officially fa-
vored by state government, religions thus themselves "established" by state law.
A leading example of such a state was Massachusetts. Rockbound and deter-
minedly Protestant Massachusetts mingled church support, claims of good gov-
ernment, and of Christian virtue indivisibly. It treated them not as Virginia had
done (by 1785), for instance, but quite differently, as a joint enterprise of good
government and good religion together. Its constitution provided for compul-
sory tax support "for the institution of the public worship of God and mainte-
nance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality."' 6 Not until
1833 did the last of these state establishments of religion disappear.
In brief, while disestablishment (the termination of state religious supports)
had occurred in Virginia in 1785, practices elsewhere among the other twelve
states differed widely when the new national constitution was under considera-
tion, between 1787 and 1789. Each state had its own way, each state composed
its own church-state choice. Moreover, the locution of "established" churches
and state-established religions was itself understood in just this sense quite
widely. Indeed, so thoroughly was this true that, for a time, the longest word in
American dictionaries reflected the differences and struggles within the several
states on the proper disposition of state establishments of religion. Those seek-
ing the discontinuance of state religious establishment laws were identified by
their ideology of church-state separation, i e., their "ism," their political com-
mitment to disestablishmentarianism. And those opposed to this trend were
identified quite oppositely (what else?)-as supporters of antidisestablish-
mentarianism, of course.
One's refreshed recollection of these "states' rights" disestablishment strug-
gles may affect one's thinking about the puzzling, archaic wording of the first
amendment. One plausible reading of the first amendment might thus be the
following one in particular. It makes a great deal of straightforward, unobscure
sense: that Congress would have no power to interfere with any state's religious
establishment laws, whatever they might be. Rather, the continuation or the
abatement of state establishments of religion would be reserved from any possi-
bility of national interference; it is this guarantee of states' rights (i.e., state plu-
ralism) that the opening clause of the first amendment crisply declares.
5. This involves a glimpse of the establishment clause as a guarantee of the right reserved to
each state to establish such religions as each might see fit to establish under its own laws.
6. See L. LEVY, supra note 4, at 26-27; see also id. at 25-62; T. CURRY, supra note 4, passim.
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An "establishment of religion" may be nothing other than a reference to
"state religious establishment laws" in this view. If so, the clause is of no con-
temporary significance at all. For, by stipulation, as long as an act of Congress
does not bear on any state's own internal constitutional church-state policy as
such, it would be unaffected by this clause. In turn, so long as an act of Con-
gress does not "prohibit" the free exercise of religion, it would be unaffected by
the balance of the full clause as well.
Consistent with this view, however, note that neither part of the full clause
would restrict Congress from providing such affirmative support for religion
overall, or even such affirmative support for particular religions, as were deemed
by Congress most conducive to the common good. So long as such national
supports as Congress might vote did not interfere with state establishment laws
in any way, they would be untrammeled (Le., unprohibited) by anything in this
clause. Such separate affirmative congressional supports would not affect any
state's own independent establishment policies, nor would they "prohibit" the
free exercise of such religions as Congress might not think worthy of affirmative
national support-but which Congress nonetheless would not presume to pro-
hibit from being sustained by private or by state support.
It is certainly true that this view of the clause would be highly unsettling to
our conventional assumptions. Note, nonetheless, how it makes its own sense of
the quaintly odd words of the first amendment. In brief, disturbing to one's
mind as it may be, this version cannot simply be dismissed. But, having ac-
knowledged as much, perhaps we ought to move on: possibly the clause is partly
driven by the purpose just suggested, but possibly this (correct) understanding
does not exhaust the clause.
A SECOND POSSIBILITY: AN AFFIRMATIVE DENIAL OF POWER IN
CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE IN RESPECT TO
ESTABLISHMENTS OF RELIGION
A different manner of understanding the four word phrase we are examin-
ing would take it in a more conventional usage than the one just tentatively
proposed above. It also fits very neatly with the free exercise clause, however,
and may-in that connection-make a great deal of suggestive sense.
In this usage of the four word phrase, "an establishment of religion" is just
what it suggests even to modern ears, i.e., it is a reference to establishments of
religion-such as churches and other kinds of ecclesiastical organizations and
any auxiliary body operating under religious auspices-and not just to state es-
tablishments of religion or state religious-establishment laws. And what the
clause does is exactly what it says: Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, i.e., NO law at all, just as the balance of the clause
forbids Congress to prohibit the free exercise of religion-the whole subject is
taken from Congress as an express limit on its enumerated powers. It is left
entirely to the disposition of each state alone. The emphasis is still a "federal-
ism" emphasis, but it is an emphasis of greater scope.
The principle that emerges draws nearer to the conventional wisdom of the
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clause. The principle is that Congress may neither prohibit the free exercise of
religion nor make any law respecting an establishment of religion, including one
of financial support. Congress, in short, is to keep hands off. Each religious
establishment is on its own, subject to how well or ill it may fare under the
different state constitutions, but not subject to Congress in any way. How well
each succeeds, just as much as how each is organized, how each operates, to
whom each appeals, etc., all aspects of establishments of religion are removed
from congressional power of any and all kinds. This interpretation, too, has a
degree of plausibility, equally with the first possibility just examined.
Religions, even in 1787, were already numerous and varied, not merely
among numerous sects of Protestantism, but among nonprotestant faiths as well,
e.g., Catholicism and a number of nonchristian groups, including Jewish, even
Muslim and Hindu religious communities and some few Buddhist centers too.
Deism, hardly a religion at all (its "theology" was little more than the positing
of a grand watchmaker who set things in motion) was the view of part of the
American intellectual class. Within Protestantism, some sects were organized
by congregation, others were administered by presbyters, others more heirarchi-
cally, some loosely or hardly organized at all. Each religion established its own
liturgy; each established its own articles of faith; each religion established its own
scriptures; all were establishments of distinctive, separate communities of faith.
Accordingly the degree of toleration and/or support of different (and differ-
ing) religions might still be dependent heavily on each state's own internal pol-
icy-the first amendment left such matters totally unaffected-but it was readily
understood that Congress would have no role of its own to play. How well each
religious community (i.e., each religious establishment) might do, how it con-
ducted itself, what theism it might or might not hold, etc., were matters of no
national laws at all.
This perspective works a substantial modification of our first review, but it
does so by extension alone. The first amendment leaves state laws unaffected. It
forbids Congress any role-"NO law respecting"-no law in respect to establish-
ments of religion; no preferential congressional support, no across-the-board
support, and likewise no prohibition (by Congress) of the free exercise of
religion.
In a very small nutshell, incidentally, note how virtually indistinguishable
this view is from Jefferson's own metaphor in his description of the first amend-
ment, in his letter to the Danbury Baptists, heartily approving the first amend-
ment as erecting "a wall of separation" between church and (national) state.
The separation is of the national government from all establishments of religion.
It also conforms quite closely to both Madison's and Jefferson's general conduct
in office as Presidents of the United States.7 It is very close to the original posi-
7. As President, Jefferson declined to issue a call for a day of national thanksgiving pursuant
to Congress's precatory request.
"I do not think myself authorized to comply .... I consider the government of the United
States as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions,
their doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from the provision that no
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tion reflected in Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme Court in Everson, in
1947, as wellA
A THIRD POSSIBILITY: No NATIONAL LAWS RESPECTING THAT WHICH IS
ESTABLISHED BY RELIGION-A CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF CIVIL
EQUALS, CONDUCTED UNDER CIVIL AUSPICES.
The preceding possibilities still leave unconsidered at least two large issues,
namely these. The first is the obvious issue of state laws and state practices
(plainly utterly unaffected by the first amendment); second is the issue of govern-
mental practices of the national government when not directed to state establish-
ments of religion or to religious establishments as such.
The first of these issues is wholly a problem directed to the fourteenth
amendment, adopted in 1868. I do not presume to address it here at all. (Suffice
it to say that the Supreme Court has regarded the fourteenth amendment as
having enacted the first amendment within itself, rendering the first amendment
identically constraining on the states. The contestable correctness of that view is
the burden of Mr. Curtis' paper in this symposium, not mine.) 9 The other prob-
lem is a problem of the national government's own conduct and practices, how-
ever, and it does deserve some additional brief treatment here.
What is that problem? It is the question of religion in government itself; the
piecemeal installation (or establishment) of religion within the operation of the
government. The tendency of government to cultivate an official religiosity, vir-
tually claiming to establish itself under God. We return to the four word phrase
law shall be made respecting the establishment or free exercise of religion, but from that
also which reserves to the States the powers not delegated to the United States....
I am aware that the practice of my predecessors may be quoted. But I have ever be-
lieved, that the example of State executives led to the assumption of that authority by the
General Government, without due examination, which would have discovered that what
might be a right in a State government, was a violation of that right when assumed by
another."
Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch
v. Donnally, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 775 (emphasis added) (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808)). For additional examples and references, see id. at 774-78.
8. In Everson, Justice Black stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state [this is an error-Justice Black is referring to his view of the effect of the
fourteenth amendment] nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
9. See M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
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one more time.10 One may think of this discussion, if one likes, as A Note on
the Civil Public Square.II
A law "respecting an establishment of religion" is a law respecting that
which is established by religion, i.e., that which is established by religion rather
than by the state. In this view of the establishment clause, the clause disallows
civil government to appropriate that which is established by religion, to take it
over or otherwise to plagiarize it, to mix it with the secular as an instrument of
state policy; the first amendment forbids the assimilative absorption or installa-
tion under claim of secular authority of that which belongs to religion and which
(by this clause-the establishment clause) is reserved from the government's ap-
propriative and misappropriative use.
The impropriety of government uses of religion-the state's tendency to-
ward the temporal commingling of the sacred and the civil-is disallowed on
several grounds:
First, it profanes religion for any secular authority to trade on its practices
for its (the state's) civil or secular ends, i.e., it is a trespass on religion by the
state; the state has no right to take things from the voluntary communities of
faith and entangle them as instruments in the conduct of civil affairs.
Second, it is an act of civil hubris for government to seek religious purchase
on ordinary civil loyalty, i.e., it confuses the consensual and the democratic with
the divine. The coupling of the civil order with religious forms or arrangements
of church support was the usual first device of kings claiming divine right for
rule. The tendency of the modern civil order to associate itself with religious
forms, practices, or creeds, is a similar act of secular supererogation the first
amendment unqualifiedly forbids.
Third, religions succumbing to the temporal temptation of symbiosis with
the state (e.g., in the installation of their faith within the public square) are inevi-
tably compromised; their integrity is lost even in that which seems merely
flattering.
Last, but by no means least, it is devastating for one's own government to
imply distinctions of superior and inferior citizenship according to one's associa-
tion or disassociation with the religion of The Public Square; it is a denial of
equal respect and an insinuation of unequal worth.
Every act by the state that appropriates from religion is necessarily profane.
The very word, "profane," conveys the essential idea. It means "outside the
temple," from "pro" [before] and from "fanus" [the temple], from which the
state has taken and thus made profane by its relocation and its secularly en-
sconced use. So, as an example, one may be offended by state appropriative uses
of the Latin cross: when taken outside the church and made a part of the civil
state's own equipment, the cross is by that act, profaned. So, too, with govern-
10. Article VI of the United States Constitution also contains the express prohibition that "no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States."
11. Cf. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1984).
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ment prescribed religious services (e.g., state teacher-conducted school prayer).
The act of profanation lies in the presumption of secular succession to, and/or
state appropriation of, things belonging to the separate voluntary community of
faith.
The notion of the Public Square is itself a strong metaphor of the civil com-
monwealth. The Public Square is always civil, e.g., it is not sacred, it does not
attempt to hallow itself or the state. And it does not profane religion by misap-
propriating from establishments of religion. It is, rather, the place where a pol-
ity's citizens meet on terms of common need and mutual regard under civil
auspices for such debate, discourse, and exchange as they have occasion to pur-
sue under civil auspices. And the public square is not "naked" in being a civil
place, Le., it need not be aluminumized, austere, unaesthetic, or cold. But it is
laid out uninsinuatingly, and it is always conducted appropriately, without dis-
regard or implied distinction among all citizens; it is conducted with the careful-
ness of equal and mutual civil regard.
Unlike a closed (or temple) community, a special community-one appro-
priately limited to the faithful-it is a public polity of civil equals. It does not
claim to be a church, it does not function as a church. It does not try to hallow
public ground. It is the civil public square that represents a civil polity of many
citizens, all of whom come and who are treated on equal and on mutually reas-
suring terms.
The sense of this natural distinction, in the conduct of open civil govern-
ment, is famously captured in James Madison's own Memorial and Remon-
strance, written during the spring of 1785. "[T]he Civil Magistrate," wrote
Madison, may not "employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy"; to do so is
both "an arrogant pretension," and an "unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation." It "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opin-
ions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority." It likewise
has a "tendency to banish our Citizens," he observed. 12 Virtually all four of the
previously noted points are eloquently compressed in these few spare phrases
from the longer essay Madison composed in his powerful (and successful)
appeal.
The state that appropriates the sacred (i.e., Latin crosses, invocations, reli-
gious mottos, icons, chaplains, hymns, or even the purposeful simulation of dis-
tinctly religious architecture), disregards Madison's pleas for civil restraint. It
does assert "an arrogant pretension," and it is an "unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation." It does "degrade from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority." It
likewise tends to "banish" those thus made to feel their difference or their aliena-
tion within this place. This iconographic, self-sanctifying state is not equally
each citizen's own civil, accessible government. Rather, in its insinuating simu-
lation of some sort of religious establishment, it is an example of the overbearing
state.
12. See W. MILLER, THE FIRsT LIBERTY 359-64 (1986).
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Following Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance (which was drawn in
the form of a Petition, signed by several thousand Virginians, and was successful
in defeating certain proposals previously pending in the Virginia General As-
sembly), the Virginia General Assembly turned around and enacted a Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. The Bill provided:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wor-
ship, place, or ministry whatsoever, or shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer
on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters
of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or
affect their civil capacities.13
If one relates this passage to the history of religious freedom in America (as
surely we may do), it, too, tends strongly to reinforce the disentanglement of the
common auspices of civil government from that which is established by and
reserved to the voluntarism of religious faiths. It completes the definition that
one identifies to the establishment clause itself.
In summary, to piggyback on I Corinthians, there are, then these three
strands in unraveling the four word phrase; that Congress shall make:
1. No law respecting each state's singular or multiple establishment laws, i.e.,
no law respecting what each state decides pursuant to its own nationally-unfet-
tered choice; and
2. No law respecting establishments of religion, i.e., no law directing their arti-
cles of faith, modes of worship or ecclesiastical affairs, no national interference
with the voluntarism of religion; and
3. No law respecting that which is established by religion, i.e., no secular
(mis)appropriation from the communities of religious faith, no borrowing-no
confusion of the national civil polity of a free and diverse citizenry with the
divine or the sacred-no self-sanctifying religious insinuation in a government
deriving its just powers from consent.
There are strong common themes of federalism, freedom, diversity, and re-
spect bound into this trinity of definitions which are themselves, the "faith,
hope, and charity" of the first amendment's first clause. Whether they are al-
ways reflected in actual government practice I cannot presume to vouch for.
But I believe they fit philosophically together, in a bicentennial review.
13. Id. at 357-58.
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